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SILENCE IS GOLDEN, UNLESS YOU’RE GETTING BILLED FOR IT: MJS
LAS CROABAS PROPERTIES, INC. AND PUNISHING LAW FIRMS WHEN
THEIR ATTORNEYS PROLONG LITIGATION
MATTHEW HALL*
“A lawyer with his briefcase can steal more money
than a hundred men with guns.”1
I.

COLD CALL: AN INTRODUCTION TO 28 U.S.C. § 1927 SANCTIONS

The notion that a lawyer armed with a briefcase may be a better thief than
one hundred men with guns, a saying from Mario Puzo’s The Godfather, dates
back nearly fifty years, but it is a sentiment that persists to this day. 2 Lawyers
are valuable contributors to society, but the public does not always hold the
profession in high esteem. 3 A lawyer can seldom go to a dinner party without
being told a corny, or perhaps even offensive, lawyer joke. 4 Moreover, it is
almost a requirement for any courtroom drama to feature a corrupt or
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1. Mario Puzo, The Godfather, G.P. Putnam’s Sons (1969).
2. See generally Public Esteem for Military Still High, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2013),
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/07/11/public-esteem-for-military-still-high
[https://perma.cc/CW5U-J8YF] (providing data on Americans’ perceptions of several
occupations); see Leo J. Shapiro, Public Perceptions of Lawyers: Consumer Research
Findings, SECTION OF LITIG.: AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (April 2002) (providing data on public’s
views of attorneys).
According to a survey conducted by the “Religion and Public Life” section of the PEW
Research Center, lawyers placed last in a list of occupations where the public was asked to
rank the extent that each “contribute[d] a lot to society’s well-being.” See Public Esteem for
Military Still High, supra (surveying public perception of different occupations). The survey
found that 18% of respondents claimed “that lawyers contribute a lot to society,” compared to
78%, 72%, and 66% for military personnel, teachers, and medical doctors, respectively. See
id. (providing survey results). Further, 34% of respondents claimed “lawyers contribute not
very much or nothing at all.” See id. (providing survey results for lawyers). Additionally, the
Litigation Section of the American Bar Association (ABA) conducted a survey that collected
data on the public’s perceptions of lawyers. See Shapiro, supra, at 2 (surveying public
perception of lawyers). This survey found that Americans believe lawyers to be “greedy,
manipulative, and corrupt.” See id. at 4 (providing results of survey).
3. See generally Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2 (illustrating negative perceptions that
public holds of attorneys). For instance, respondents of the survey commented that their own
experiences with attorneys led to the opinion that attorneys are unethical. See id. at 9
(providing reasons for negative perceptions).
4. See, e.g., Lawyer Jokes, READER’S DIGEST, http://www.rd.com/jokes/lawyer
[https://perma.cc/92WV-WPY7] (last visited October Oct. 2, 2016) (“A lawyer e-mailed a
client: ‘Dear Jennifer: Thought I saw you on the street the other day. Crossed over to say
hello, but it wasn’t you, so I went back. One tenth of an hour: $30.’”).

(41)
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incompetent lawyer.5 Although these portrayals in the media and pop-culture
are often exaggerated, they nevertheless reflect the public sentiment that law is
not the most ethical profession.6
Although lawyers often get a bad rap, it is not always without merit. 7 They
sometimes do unethical and unprofessional things. 8 They lie.9 They bill for
hours they didn’t earn.10 They post pictures of themselves on Facebook holding
a shotgun with the captions like this: “You should take the plea.” 11 With these
bad apples out there, it is no wonder that the public questions attorneys’
morals.12 However, the legal community is not without hope.13
In response to, or perhaps in anticipation of, attorney misconduct and the
negative light it casts on the profession as a whole, the legal institution has
taken measures to increase professionalism and competence among attorneys.14

5. See, e.g., THE FIRM (Davis Entertainment 1993); BETTER CALL SAUL (High Bridge
Productions 2015); MAKING A MURDERER (Netflix 2015).
6. For examples of behavior that reflect public perception of lawyers, see supra notes
2-5 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of public perceptions of attorneys, see supra notes 2–5 and
accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., 2014 Survey on Lawyer Discipline System, AM. BAR ASS’N CENTER FOR
PROF. RESP. (Jan. 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2014
_sold_final_results.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T6K-57FD] (providing data on
attorney sanctions throughout United States). In 2014, a total of 88,930 complaints were
made to state disciplinary committees concerning attorney misconduct. See id. at 5 (providing
sanction data).
9. See, e.g., Joe Patrice, Lawyer Who Lied About His Mom Dying . . . Allegedly Lied
Again TO THE SAME JUDGE, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 18, 2016),
http://abovethelaw.com/2016/04/lawyer-who-lied-about-his-mom-dying-allegedly-lied-againto-the-same-judge [https://perma.cc/T8YG-D6PJ] (describing case in which lawyer lied to
judge to receive extension).
10. See, e.g., Elie Mystal, When I Get That Feeling, I Want Sexual Billing, ABOVE THE
LAW (Jan. 15, 2013), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/01/when-i-get-that-feeling-i-want-sexualbilling [https://perma.cc/6DNU-XMVZ] (describing case where lawyer billed client for sex);
Kathryn Rubino, Lawyer Sent Fake Bills to Company for 14 Years. Lesson: Check Yo Bills,
ABOVE THE LAW (July 25, 2016), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/07/lawyer-sent-fake-bills-tocompany-for-14-years-lesson-check-yo-bills [https://perma.cc/7AXL-RA53] (describing case
where lawyer sent fake bills to his employer).
11. See Joe Patrice, DA Brandishes Shotgun in Facebook Picture Captioned, ‘You
Should Take The Plea’, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 3, 2015), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/08/dabrandishes-shotgun-in-facebook-picture-captioned-you-should-take-the-plea
[https://perma.cc/JJ2H-3JCT] (describing case where assistant district attorney jokingly
threatened defendant on social media).
12. For a discussion of public perceptions of attorneys, see supra notes 2–5 and
accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the measures the legal community is taking to fight unethical
behavior, see infra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preface (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(introducing rules governing attorney professional and ethical conduct). The ABA initially
“adopted the original Canons of Professional Ethics” in 1908, a set of guidelines that delineate
proper attorney conduct. See id. (describing history of ethics rules). In 1969, the ABA
introduced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and later in 1983 the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. See JAMES E. MOLITERNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
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For example, the American Bar Association founded the Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. 15 Further, state bar associations
require practicing attorneys to complete a minimum number of continuing legal
education (CLE) ethics credits each year. 16 The American Bar Association also
requires law schools to offer a legal professionalism or ethics course. 17
Despite these efforts, however, unethical and unprofessional behavior
continues to plague the legal profession. 18 One particular type of attorney
misconduct that has received attention in federal courts is covered by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.19 This statute permits courts to impose sanctions on attorneys that
“unreasonably and vexatiously” multiply proceedings. 20 However, courts
disagree as to whether the statute holds law firms jointly and severally liable for
an attorney’s violation of the statute. 21 MJS Las Croabas Properties, Inc. v.
Federal Deposit Institution Corp.,22 the subject of this Note, is the most recent

GOVERNING LAWYERS 19 (4th ed. 2012) (describing updates to Model Rules of Professional
Conduct).
15. See Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, AM. BAR
ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ethi
csandprofessionalresponsibility.html [https://perma.cc/YEB8-3FKQ] (last visited Sept. 6,
2016) (providing background on Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility).
16. See, e.g., Pennsylvania MCLE Requirements, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states/states_p-z/pennsylvania.html
[https://perma.cc/R7EB-FCS4] (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) (requiring attorneys practicing in
Pennsylvania to complete two hours of ethics education credits per year).
17. See generally ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools,
AM. BAR ASS’N 1, 3-46 (2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/20
16_2017_aba_standards_and_rules_of_procedure.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ25E664] (providing requirements for law schools to become accredited under ABA). The ABA
recognizes that professionalism is an issue in the legal field and requires that a law school
“requires each student to satisfactorily complete . . . one course of at least two credit hours in
professional responsibility.” See id. at 16 (explaining requirements set by ABA). See also
Lisa G. Lerman, Teaching Ethics in and Outside of Law Schools: What Works and What
Doesn’t, PROF. LAW. 57, 58 (2006) (surveying obstacles for teaching ethics in law schools).
Lerman argues that because an ethics course may be the only requirement for upper level
students, those students may resent it and not take it seriously. See id. (explaining why
students may not take ethics courses seriously).
18. For data on complaints concerning attorney misconduct, see supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
19. See Joan C. Rogers, Firms Can Be Sanctioned Under Vexatious Litigation Statute,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/search/results/98e7a2cbf938db37ce22fff0e546eb51/documen
t/XDQ15C9G000000?jcsearch=dk%253Abna%2520a0h9n8n1u0#jcite (describing circuit
split over 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (explaining counsel’s liability for excessive costs).
For a further discussion of the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 38–45 and
accompanying text.
21. For a description of the circuit split over 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 49–84
and accompanying text.
22. 545 B.R. 401 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).
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decision to contribute to the circuit split.23
The Bankruptcy Court in MJS Las Croabas held that law firms could be
held jointly and severally liable for their attorneys’ violations of 28 U.S.C. §
1927.24 This Note discusses how the court reached that conclusion, and argues
that a broad interpretation, which includes sanctioning of law firms, will
promote ethical behavior among attorneys.25 Part II describes the requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and discusses the opinions that created the circuit split.26
Part III reviews the facts of MJS Las Croabas.27 Part IV describes the court’s
reasoning in concluding that law firms can be sanctioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.28 Part V provides a critical analysis of the opinion in MJS Las Croabas
and offers a framework as to how both the courts and the legislature should
approach the statute.29 Finally, Part VI considers the impact of MJS Las
Croabas and calls for the legislature to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1927 so that the
statute clearly applies to law firms with the aim of promoting ethical and
professional behavior.30
II. THE LINES HAVE GOTTEN CROSSED: VARYING
INTERPRETATIONS OF 28 U.S.C § 1927
Attorneys will occasionally go to extreme lengths to delay or prolong
litigation.31 Consider the case of Holly Gail Crampton, in which Crampton, a
lawyer, dropped her client’s case after determining that the client would not
win.32 Crampton, however, neglected to tell either the court or opposing
counsel about her decision.33 Not knowing that the case was dropped, the
defendants continued preparing for trial, and they incurred attorneys’ fees as a
result.34 Crampton’s unprofessional behavior is one of many examples of the
23. For a complete discussion of the facts of MJS Las Croabas, see infra notes 85–128
and accompanying text. For the court’s reasoning, see infra notes 132–64 and accompanying
text.
24. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 421 (affirming lower court’s ruling that law
firms can be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
25. For the court’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 132–64 and
accompanying text. For a discussion on how the interpretation can promote ethical conduct
among practicing attorneys, see infra notes 165-214 and accompanying text.
26. For a further discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the varying interpretations of the
statute among the several circuit courts, see infra notes 38–84.
27. For a discussion of the facts of MJS Las Croabas, see infra notes 85–128 and
accompanying text.
28. For a description of the court’s analysis in MJS Las Croabas, see infra notes 132–
64 and accompanying text.
29. For a critical analysis of the interpretation of 28 U.S.C § 1927, see infra notes 165–
214 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion on the impact of MJS Las Croabas on attorney conduct, see infra
notes 199–210 and accompanying text.
31. For examples of attorneys prolonging litigation, see infra note 45 and
accompanying text.
32. See Edwards v. General Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 242, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1998)
(providing background of case).
33. See id.
34. See id. (providing background of case).
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type of conduct that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is meant to cover.35 However, courts
disagree on who or what can be punished under the statute.36 While some
courts restrict the statute’s reach to only individual attorneys, like Crampton,
others take a broader interpretation and apply it to attorneys and law firms
alike.37
28 U.S.C. § 1927 was enacted to deter “intentional and unnecessary
delay[s] in the proceedings.”38 It provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of
the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. 39
Although the language of the statute can confuse even the sharpest of
minds, it essentially punishes attorneys who unnecessarily prolong a case by
requiring them to pay for any costs that the other party incurred as a result of
their conduct.40 The statute is intended to target conduct that disrespects both
the court and the attorney’s duties to the legal profession. 41
To be held liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the attorney must be more than
careless or incompetent.42 Some circuit courts require a showing of bad faith. 43
Others ask whether the conduct had the end effect of “harassing” or “annoying,”

35. For examples of sanctionable conduct in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra
note 45 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion on how courts disagree as to who can be sanctioned under 28
U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 49–84 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion on how courts disagree as to who can be sanctioned under 28
U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 49–84 and accompanying text.
38. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171,
1177 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (explaining counsel’s liability for excessive costs).
40. See Douglas Pepe, Persuading Courts to Impose Sanctions on Your Adversary, 6
AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. LITIG. 1, 2 (2010) (describing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 violations as consisting
of “basically any conduct that prolongs the case and causes additional expense and delay”).
While the purpose of the statute is meant to deter attorneys from delaying litigation, a “strict
construction is necessary so that the provision will in no way dampen the legitimate zeal of an
attorney in representing his or her client.” See Janet Eve Josselyn, The Song of Sirens—
Sanctioning Lawyers Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 31 B.C. L. REV. 477, 480 (1990) (describing
purpose of statute).
41. See Jensen v. Phillips Screw Co., 546 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[A]n attorney’s
actions must evince a studied disregard of the need for an orderly judicial process . . . , or add
up to a reckless breach of the lawyer’s obligations as an officer of the court.”) (citations
omitted).
42. See Jensen, 546 F.3d at 64 (“Garden-variety carelessness or even incompetence,
without more, will not suffice to ground the imposition of sanctions under section 1927.”).
Although not all courts require bad faith to show a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, such a
showing is typically sufficient. See id. (explaining bad faith as sufficient to satisfy 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927).
43. See, e.g., New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir.
1989) (noting requirement of subjective bad faith when imposing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions).
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and an attorney’s intentions are irrelevant to this analysis. 44 Examples of
sanctionable conduct under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 include filing the same complaint
multiple times and making unnecessary discovery requests. 45
Although the specific conduct covered by the statute has been clarified, the
answer to “who” or “what” is liable is not as clear.46 Several circuit courts
argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies only to individuals, and that law firms do
not qualify as “individuals” within the meaning of the statute.47 Other courts,
by contrast, apply 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to both attorneys and the law firms where
they work.48
A. Sent Straight to Voicemail: Courts That Do Not Apply
28 U.S.C. § 1927 to Law Firms
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all refused to apply 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 to law firms.49 In BDT Productions, Inc. v. Lexmark International,
Inc.,50 the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court of Eastern Kentucky, which
had imposed 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against the law firm Meisenheimer

44. See, e.g., Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 632 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Behavior is
‘vexatious’ when it is harassing or annoying, regardless of whether it is intended to be so.”).
45. See Pepe, supra note 40, at 3 (providing examples of sanctionable conduct under
28 U.S.C. § 1927). As another example, the defendants in Siderpali, S.P.A. v. Judal
Industries, Inc. were sanctioned for re-filing a motion that had already been denied by the
court. See Siderpali, S.P.A. v. Judal Industries, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1023, 1028 (S.D.N.Y 1993)
(determining re-filing of previously denied motion was sanctionable). The attorneys in
Kotsilieris v. Chalmers were sanctioned for requesting a jury the night before the trial was
scheduled to commence. See Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966 F.2d 1181, 1183 (7th Cir. 1992)
(requesting jury night before trial was sanctionable).
46. For a discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 49–84 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1294–95 (9th Cir.
2015) (holding law firms excluded from 28 U.S.C. § 1927); BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark
Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 751 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Even if firms can admittedly be personified in
a literary sense through briefs, there is no reason to consider a law firm a ‘person’ under the
statute.”); FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 614 F.3d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Liability under § 1927 is direct, not vicarious.”); Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556
F.3d 389, 395 n.6 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[Section] 1927 does not authorize the imposition of
sanctions on a represented party, nor does it authorize the imposition of sanctions on a law
firm.”); Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–24 (7th Cir. 2005) (interpreting “other
person admitted to conduct cases” language of statute).
48. See, e.g., Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“[N]othing in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, . . leads us to think that the District Court
was without authority to impose sanctions on Arnold & Itkin as a whole.”); Smith v. Grand
Bank & Tr. of Fla., 193 F. App’x. 833, 838 (11th Cir. 2006) (agreeing that 28 U.S.C. § 1927
applies to law firms); Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., Inc., 236 F.3d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 2001)
(affirming 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against law firm); LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co.,
146 F.3d 899, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (affirming district court ruling that law firm was liable for
expenses incurred due to vexatious and unreasonable multiplication of proceedings); Baker
Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming 28 U.S.C. § 1927
sanctions against Cravath law firm).
49. For a sample of cases that did not hold law firms liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
50. 602 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Herron & Steel (Meisenheimer).51 The law firm was initially sanctioned for
filing a frivolous claim.52 In reversing the district court’s sanctions against
Meisenheimer, the circuit court explained that a law firm is not a “person” as
required by the statute, nor is a firm “admitted” to appear before the court. 53
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit judge in Claiborne v. Wisdom54 reversed the
district court’s ruling that a law firm can be sanctioned because one of its
attorneys filed a baseless claim.55 Similar to the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that only individuals are admitted to practice law,
and law firms are not “individuals” under the statute. 56 Further, the Seventh
Circuit asserted that the language “other person admitted to conduct cases” does
not apply to law firms, but instead, includes only other non-attorney
individuals.57
In addition to BDT and Claiborne, the Ninth Circuit in Kaass Law v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A.58 reversed the district court’s sanctions against the law firm. 59

51. See id. at 743–44, 751 (holding law firms cannot be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927).
52. See id. at 749–50 (providing background of case). The plaintiff, BDT Products,
alleged that the defendant, Lexmark, had stolen its design for a printer tray. See id. at 743
(explaining plaintiff’s argument). The court, however, found that the design was not
proprietary as it was previously released to the public. See id. at 749 (finding design was not
proprietary). As a result, the district court sanctioned BDT’s law firm, Meisenheimer Herron
& Steel, for bringing “a lawsuit that should never have been brought, and in which no attorney
should have persisted.” See id. (explaining court sanctions imposed on law firm) (citation
omitted).
53. See id. at 751 (“Even if firms can admittedly be personified in a literary sense
through briefs, there is no reason to consider a law firm a ‘person’ under the statute. More
importantly, law firms are not ‘admitted’ to ‘conduct cases’ in court.”).
54. 414 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2005).
55. See id. at 717–18, 720, 724 (providing factual background). The plaintiff, Toni
Claiborne, alleged that she was wrongfully evicted from her apartment after turning down the
building manager’s sexual advances. See id. at 717 (describing plaintiff’s claim). Claiborne’s
complaint asserted that the defendant engaged in similar conduct with other women, and that
both her and her lawyer, Boyd, interviewed those women to support her claim. See id. at 718
(explaining plaintiff’s complaint). However, those women later denied ever corroborating
Claiborne’s story, and Claiborne subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. See id. (indicating
factors that led to plaintiff’s motion to dismiss). In response to Claiborne’s allegations, which
were not supported by factual evidence, the district court sanctioned Claiborne, Boyd, and
Boyd’s law firm for vexatiously and unreasonably multiplying the proceedings. See id at 718,
722. (sanctioning law firm).
56. See id. at 723 (“Individual lawyers, not firms, are admitted to practice before both
the state courts and the federal courts.” (citations omitted)).
57. See id. (interpreting meaning of statute). The court argued that the term “other
person” is limited to non-attorney individuals that may appear before the court. See id.
(noting court’s interpretation of “other person”). The court refers to both the Code of Federal
Regulations and the Indiana Rules of Court. See id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 10.14; IND. R. CT.
2.1). (referring to statutes that permit non-attorneys to appear before court). 37 C.F.R. § 10.14
permits certain non-attorneys to participate in patent proceedings, while IND. R. CT. 2.1
permits “supervised law students to act as attorneys.” See id. (comparing 37 C.F.R. § 10.14
and IND. R. CT. 2.1). The court refused to extend the meaning of other person to law firms,
claiming that to do so would be “too much of a stretch.” See id. (noting court’s reasoning for
limiting its interpretation of “other person”).
58. 799 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 2015).
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Comparing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court concluded that the legislature could not have intended for
28 U.S.C. § 1927 to apply to law firms because Rule 11 explicitly mentions
“law firm[s].”60 If the legislature intended 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to apply to law
firms, the words “law firms” would have been included in the statute. 61
B. Taking the Call: Courts That Do Apply
28 U.S.C. § 1927 to Law Firms
In contrast to the abovementioned courts, the Second, Third, Eighth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits take the opposing viewpoint, holding that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 does apply to law firms.62 Additionally, the First Circuit has implicitly
held law firms liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.63 Finally, the Southern District of
New York has imposed 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against a law firm, a
decision the MJS Las Croabas court finds persuasive.64
In Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp.,65 the Second Circuit affirmed the
Southern District of New York’s 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against the Arnold
& Itkin law firm.66 The Second Circuit held that district courts have wide
59. See id. at 1295 (reversing district court). Wells Fargo argued that Kaass Law
“multipl[ied] the proceedings” by (1) “fail[ing] to differentiate Wells Fargo from the other
defendants,” (2) “failing to communicate its intent to file a motion for leave to amend, and
then filing a motion for leave to amend the day after Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss[,]”
(3) “failing to oppose Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss[,]” and (4) “filing . . . ‘boilerplate’
complaints” that were not specific to the current issue. See id. at 1292 (explaining defendant’s
legal argument). The district court imposed sanctions against Kaass Law in the amount of
$8,480. See id. (noting monetary amount of fine imposed on law firm).
60. See id. at 1294–95 (describing and differentiating FED. R. CIV. P. 11 from 28
U.S.C. § 1927).
61. See id. (comparing 28 U.S.C. to § 1927 to FED. R. CIV. P. 11). The court applies
the doctrine of “expressio unius.” See id. at 1294 (interpreting statute). Expressio unius
stands for the proposition that anything mentioned in the statute is covered whereas anything
not mentioned is excluded. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 455 (1989). The court further reasoned that the language of
§ 1927 is specific enough to justify the interpretation that law firms were not considered under
the statute—the legislature would not have written the statute with such “specificity” if it
intended for it to apply to a larger class. See Kaass, 799 F.3d at 1294 (citation omitted)
(noting why law firms do not fall under statute’s umbrella).
62. For a sample of cases that extended liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to law firms,
see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
63. For a discussion of the First Circuit’s implicit sanctions against a law firm under 28
U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
64. For a discussion of the Southern District of New York’s imposition of sanctions
against a law firm, see infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
65. 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012).
66. See id. at 149 (affirming district court’s holding). In April 2006, Michael Enmon
attempted to finance an acquisition of a piping company by applying for a loan from Prospect.
See id. at 140 (explaining facts of case). As part of the application, Enmon signed an
arbitration agreement that required all disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration in
New York. See id. (explaining facts of case). However, Prospect ultimately denied Enmon’s
loan application. See id. at 141 (explaining facts of case). In September 2006, the attorney
who represented Enmon in the failed transaction, Robert Fiser, sued Enmon for unpaid legal
fees. See id. at 141 (explaining plaintiff’s allegations). At this time, Enmon was represented
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discretion when imposing sanctions. 67 The court also noted a “long-standing
practice” of sanctioning law firms pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and deemed it
unnecessary to change this tradition.68 Finally, the court held that the individual
attorney’s actions were “indistinguishable” from those of the law firm, and
therefore it was appropriate to sanction the law firm as a whole.69
Other circuit courts have implicitly imposed sanctions against law firms
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.70 For instance, the Third Circuit in Baker
Industry, Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd.71 affirmed the district court’s sanctions against
the Cravath, Swaine, and Moore law firm. 72 The Eighth Circuit in Lee v. First
Lenders Institution Services, Inc.73 similarly affirmed sanctions against the
plaintiff’s law firm.74 Lastly, the First Circuit in Jensen v. Phillips Screw Co.75
implicitly affirmed sanctions against a law firm when it remanded the case back
to the district court on matters unrelated to the sanction. 76
Further, while the Eleventh Circuit in Smith v. Grand Bank & Trust of
Florida77 did not issue sanctions to the attorney nor the law firm, it nevertheless
analyzed whether or not the law firm should be sanctioned.78 In refusing to
extend the sanctions to the law firm, the court reasoned that Scott Behren was
by Jason Itkin, a partner at the Arnold & Itkin law firm. See id. (indicating defendant’s
representation). Itkin subsequently filed claims against Prospect. See id. (noting defendant’s
claims against third party). In response to Itkin’s claims, Prospect filed for arbitration in New
York, as agreed upon in the arbitration agreement. See id. (noting why case was filed in New
York). Itkin notified Prospect that he was filing a temporary restraining order in Texas state
court to stay the arbitration proceedings. See id. (explaining facts of case). Prospect filed a
similar order in the Southern District of New York. See id. (explaining facts of case).
However, Itkin failed to notify the Texas state court that an order was filed in New York
federal court. See id. (indicating defendant’s failed actions). The district court imposed
sanctions against Arnold & Itkin for filing the order in bad faith. See id. at 143–44
(sanctioning law firm).
67. See id. at 147 (asserting that courts possess inherent power to impose sanctions,
and that power applies to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions).
68. See id. (citing prior district court cases that sanction law firms under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927). See, e.g., Reichmann v. Neumann, 553 F. Supp. 2d 307, 319–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(sanctioning law firm for repeatedly altering arguments when confronted with unfavorable
facts); ACLI Gov’t Sec., Inc. v. Rhoades, 907 F. Supp. 66, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (sanctioning
law firm for filing baseless claim).
69. See Enmon, 675 F.3d at 148 (“The District Court . . . properly attributed the actions
of Jason Itkin to the entire firm. . . . Throughout the litigation, Itkin’s actions were
indistinguishable from those of Arnold & Itkin as a firm.”).
70. For a discussion of cases that implicitly imposed 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes
71–84 and accompanying text.
71. 764 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1985).
72. See id. at 212 (affirming sanctions imposed by district court on law firm pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
73. 236 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2001).
74. See id. at 445 (affirming district court’s sanctions imposed on law firm pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1927).
75. 546 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2008).
76. For a discussion of Jensen, see infra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
77. 193 F. App’x. 833 (11th Cir. 2006).
78. See id. at 838–39 (determining whether law firm should be sanctioned). The circuit
court explicitly declared that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies to law firms. See id. at 838
(“[Plaintiff] correctly argues that § 1927 allows for sanctions against a law firm.”).
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the only attorney at his law firm who worked on the case, and if anyone were to
be sanctioned in this case, it would be him.79 However, the court did
acknowledge that law firms can be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for
“vexatiously and unreasonably” multiplying the proceedings. 80
A final example, Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc.,81 comes from
the Southern District of New York.82 The court in Brignoli found that law firms
are “other person[s] admitted to conduct cases” and therefore can be sanctioned
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.83 Although the case was decided in a district court
within the First Circuit, the MJS Las Croabas court found Brignoli’s reasoning
persuasive.84
III. GETTING A BUSY SIGNAL: AN ATTORNEY’S UNRESPONSIVENESS
LEADS TO A LONG PROCEEDING
In MJS Las Croabas, one attorney’s unresponsiveness caused opposing
counsel to incur expenses that could have been avoided.85 The relevant parties
to this case include (1) MJS Las Croabas Properties, Inc. (MJS), (2) the Federal
Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), (3) Trigild, Inc. (Trigild), (4) the trustee,
Mr. Wilfredo Segarra Miranda, and (5) the Homeowners Association (HOA). 86

79. See id. (ruling that law firm is not liable). The attorney in this case, Behren, filed a
frivolous claim in bad faith. See id. at 837 (discussing facts of case). However, the court
determined that the attorney’s conduct did not multiply the proceedings. See id. at 838
(discussing holding of case). In refusing to sanction Behren’s law firm, the court considered
the following factors: (1) Behren was the only attorney who was assigned to the case and (2)
he was fired during the case. See id. at 838–39 (discussing factors to consider for determining
sanction violation). Although the law firm signed the pleadings and paid for the filing fees,
the court did not consider this conduct enough to outweigh the other factors. See id. (finding
that sanctions were not appropriate).
80. See id. at 838 (noting that law firms can be sanctioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927).
81. 735 F. Supp. 100, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (sanctioning law firm under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927).
82. See id. at 100 (explaining procedural history).
83. See id. at 102 (holding law firms as “other person[s] admitted to conduct cases”
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927) (citation omitted).
84. For a discussion of how the MJS Las Croabas court applied the reasoning from
Brignoli, see infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
85. For a discussion of how the attorney’s unresponsiveness caused opposing counsel
to incur expenses, see infra notes 95–128 and accompanying text.
86. See MJS Las Croabas Props., Inc. v. FDIC, 545 B.R. 401, 404 n.1 & 3–4 (B.A.P.
1st Cir. 2016) (noting relevant parties). MJS is a real estate company established in 2004. See
id. at 405 n.3 (noting relevant parties). MJS built residential units in a development called
“The Ocean Club at Seven Seas.” See id. (discussing facts of case). MJS owed FDIC $20
million. See id. (discussing facts of case). As per protocol under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
case, the court appointed Trigild as a receiver and Mr. Segarra Miranda as trustee. See id.
(identifying trustee). A receiver is “appointed by a judge to take [control of a
debtor’s] . . . property.” See Receiver, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY
https://www.nolo.com/dictionary/receiver-term.html [https://perma.cc/A8PV-3LLU] (last
visited Sept. 7, 2016) (defining receiver). Finally, HOA was both a creditor to MJS and the
administrator of “The Ocean Club at Seven Seas.” See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 405 n.6
(describing relevant parties).
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Ms. Anabelle Quiñones-Rodriguez, an attorney for the Castellanos & Gierbolini
(Castellanos) law firm, served as counsel for HOA. 87 Finally, Mr. Manuel
Fernández-Bared, Mr. Brian M. Dick-Biascoechea, and Mr. Jeffrey Sandell
served as counsel for FDIC.88
On July 19, 2012, MJS filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 89 The case was
subsequently changed to a Chapter 7 case, and Mr. Segarra Miranda was named
the trustee.90 In response to the MJS bankruptcy, Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez filed
a motion for relief from stay on August 14, 2014.91 Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez
filed the motion on behalf of HOA, who was trying to recover damages for
construction defects at The Ocean Club at Seven Seas. 92 HOA managed The
Ocean Club at Seven Seas, and it alleged that MJS was responsible for the
defects.93
On August 15, 2014, the judge summoned FDIC and one of HOA’s
creditors, and also scheduled a hearing for September 9, 2014. 94 After receiving
the summons, Mr. Fernández-Bared, counsel for FDIC, called Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez several times to resolve the matter before the hearing. 95 Ms.
Quiñones-Rodriguez did not respond to nor return any of the calls. 96 Trigild
87. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 405 (describing Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s
relationship with Castellano law firm). Castellanos & Gierbolini later renamed their firm
“Castellanos Group Law Firm.” See id. at 405 n.4 (renaming firm).
88. See id. at 405–07 n.8 (listing FDIC counsel). Mr. Fernández-Bared and Mr. DickBiascoechea were local counsel for FDIC. See id. at 405-07 (listing local counsel). Mr.
Sandell also represented FDIC and was located in Dallas, Texas. See id. at 406–07 n.8
(naming Mr. Sandell as counsel for FDIC).
89. See id. at 404–05 (noting MJS’s bankruptcy filing). A business filing for Chapter
11 bankruptcy proposes a plan to reorganize the business. See Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy
Basics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/4F2EB96J] (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (describing Chapter 11 bankruptcy). This reorganization
allows the business to pay back creditors following an extended schedule. See id. (describing
Chapter 11 bankruptcy).
90. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 405 (providing background of case). When a
business files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a trustee is appointed to sell any non-exempt assets
and use the proceeds to repay creditors. See Chapter 7 - Bankruptcy Basics, UNITED STATES
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/7MCM-GZ9L] (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) (describing
Chapter 7 bankruptcy).
91. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 405 (providing background of case). In her
motion, Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez represented herself as an attorney at Castellanos. See id.
(discussing representation by Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).
92. See id. (noting HOA allegations against MJS).
93. See id. (noting HOA allegations against MJS).
94. See id. (describing summons). A creditor is defined as “one to whom a debt is
owed.” See Creditor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “creditor”).
95. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 405 (describing Mr. Fernández-Bared’s
attempts to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez). Mr. Fernández-Bared called Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez on August 19, 20, and 21. See id. (discussing facts of case).
96. See id. at 405–06 (describing Mr. Fernández-Bared’s attempts to contact Ms.
Quiñones-Rodriguez). Each time Mr. Fernández-Bared called Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez, he
was told that she was not available. See id. (describing Mr. Fernández-Bared’s attempts to
contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez). He left a voice message each time. See id. (describing Mr.
Fernández-Bared’s attempts to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez). Albino Acosta, an
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and Mr. Segarra Miranda also attempted to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez,
but Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez did not respond.97 In light of these failed attempts
to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez, FDIC, Trigild, and Mr. Segarra Miranda
requested additional time to respond to the motion. 98
On August 29, 2014, FDIC again attempted to contact Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez through another attorney, Mr. Dick-Biascoechea.99 Subsequent to
leaving a phone message, Mr. Dick-Biascoechea followed up with an email
urging Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez to respond.100 Again, Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez
remained silent.101 Trigild’s attorney then emailed Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez on
September 3, 2014.102 Again, Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez did not respond.103
Finally, on September 4, 2014, FDIC and Trigild filed an opposition to HOA’s
motion.104
At 4:51 PM on September 8, 2014, while Mr. Sandell was en route from
Dallas to Puerto Rico to attend the hearing scheduled for the following day, Ms.
Quiñones-Rodriguez filed a motion to withdraw the initial relief motion. 105 The
following morning, counsel for FDIC filed a response requesting that HOA and
administrative assistant at Castellanos, later testified that she answered “most if not all” phone
calls made to the law firm. See id. at 409 (introducing assistant’s testimony). She claimed
that she did not speak to counsel for the FDIC or Trustee. See id. (describing Mr. FernándezBared’s attempts to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).
97. See id. at 406 (describing Trigild’s and Trustee’s attempts to contact Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez).
98. See id. (describing FDIC’s motion to extend). On August 27, 2014, FDIC
requested an additional seven days to respond to HOA’s motion. See id. (describing FDIC’s
motion to extend). Trigild and Trustee similarly filed motions to extend on August 28 and 29,
respectively. See id. (describing Trigild’s and Trustee’s motions to extend). All motions were
granted. See id. (discussing approval of motions to extend).
99. See id. (describing Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s attempt to contact Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez). Mr. Dick-Biascoechea was told that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez was “unavailable.”
See id. (describing Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s attempt to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).
100. See id. (describing Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).
In the email, Mr. Dick-Biascoechea identified himself as the attorney for FDIC. See id.
(describing Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez). He informed Ms.
Quiñones-Rodriguez that both he and Mr. Fernández-Bared had attempted to contact her, and
he urged her to respond so that all parties could resolve the conflict as quickly as possible.
See id. (describing content of Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).
101. See id. (describing Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).
102. See id. (describing Trigild’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez). In the email,
Trigild expressed its concerns over HOA’s motion and asked her to respond before its
opposition was due. See id. (describing Trigild’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).
103. See id. (describing Trigild’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).
104. See id. (providing FDIC’s opposition to relief motion). FDIC explained that it
attempted to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez on several occasions and that she was
unresponsive to all attempts. See id. at 407 (providing FDIC’s opposition to relief motion).
FDIC also claimed that HOA’s motion was improper. See id. (providing FDIC’s opposition
to relief motion). Accordingly, FDIC argued that HOA’s motion for relief should be denied.
See id. Trigild also filed an opposition. See id. (providing Trigild’s opposition to relief
motion).
105. See id. (describing Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s motion to withdraw). Ms.
Quiñones-Rodriguez did not explain why the motion was made the night before the hearing,
nor did she explain why she was withdrawing the motion. See id. (describing Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez’s motion to withdraw).
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Castellanos reimburse them for all expenses incurred as a result of preparing for
and travelling to the September 9, 2014 hearing. 106 They argued that Ms.
Quiñones-Rodriguez’s failure to respond resulted in expenses that could have
been avoided if she simply responded to their calls or emails. 107 FDIC also
asked the court to conduct the September 9, 2014 hearing as scheduled. 108
At the hearing, the judge gave Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos
time to respond to FDIC’s sanction requests. 109 On September 19, 2014, Mr.
Segarra Miranda joined FDIC’s motion requesting sanctions, arguing that Ms.
Quiñones-Rodriguez’s failure to respond resulted in “unnecessarily increased
administrative expenses of the estate.” 110 On October 2, 2014, the bankruptcy
court sanctioned both Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos.111
HOA immediately filed an opposition to the sanctions and asked the court
to vacate the order.112 HOA argued:
(1) [L]aw firms are not responsible for the signatures of their
attorneys; (2) the imposition of sanctions under § 1927 requires a
finding of bad faith and vexatious conduct; (3) counsel for the FDIC
could have appeared telephonically to avoid travel costs; (4) neither
the FDIC nor [Segarra Miranda] “exhausted” their remedies by
sending a letter to opposing counsel, “explaining what they
consider[ed] frivolous”; and (5) “defending or prosecuting a lawsuit”
was a “valid exercise of its First Amendment rights.”113
Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez also testified on behalf of HOA, claiming that she
was an “independent contractor.”114 On October 16, 2014, the court granted the
motion, vacated the sanctions, and gave FDIC twenty-one days to respond to
HOA’s opposition.115 The FDIC filed its response on November 6, 2014,

106. See id. (describing FDIC’s response motion to HOA’s withdrawal).
107. See id. (explaining that FDIC counsel was forced to prepare for hearing because
of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s unresponsiveness). Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez explained that the
law firm was in the process of moving offices and communicating with opposing counsel was
difficult. See id. at 407–08 (discussing Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s explanation for being
unresponsive).
108. See id. at 407 (describing FDIC’s response motion to HOA’s withdrawal).
109. See id. at 408 (describing September 9, 2014 hearing). The judge added that if
FDIC incurred costs because of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s unresponsiveness, FDIC would
have to be compensated for those costs. See id. (describing September 9, 2014 hearing).
110. See id. (describing Trustee’s motion to join FDIC). The Trustee requested that
Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez be sanctioned and that the court hold HOA’s withdrawal on
September 8, 2014 “with prejudice.” See id. (describing Trustee’s motion to join FDIC).
111. See id. (describing court’s sanctions of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos).
112. See id. at 409 (describing HOA’s opposition to sanctions).
113. Id. (third alteration in original) (describing HOA’s opposition to sanctions).
114. See id. (providing Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s testimony). Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez argued that she was not an employee of Castellanos, but an independent contractor.
See id. (explaining Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s argument). She claimed she was unaware of
communication attempts made by opposing counsel or that Mr. Sandell was travelling to the
hearing. See id. (providing Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s testimony).
115. See id. at 410 (granting HOA’s motion to vacate sanctions).
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arguing that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez should be sanctioned for two reasons. 116
FDIC argued that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez multiplied the proceedings by (1)
filing a baseless motion and (2) failing to respond to opposing counsel’s calls
and emails.117
In March of 2015, the bankruptcy court found Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez
and the Castellanos law firm “jointly and severally” liable in violation of 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and ordered them to repay FDIC for all expenses incurred as a
result of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s misconduct.118 The bankruptcy court noted
that attorneys have the duty to resolve conflicts as efficiently as possible, a duty
that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez failed to fulfill.119 The court also noted that if
Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez had conducted a simple inquiry before filing the case,
she would have discovered that FDIC had a lien over MJS’s assets and that
FDIC would have priority as a creditor.120
On April 16, 2015, the Castellanos law firm challenged the sanctions on
several grounds.121 Nevertheless, the court maintained the sanctions.122
Castellanos appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Court. 123 Most relevant is
Castellanos’s argument that 28 U.S.C § 1927 does not apply to law firms.124
The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the First Circuit affirmed
the circuit court’s holding.125 The First Circuit bankruptcy court agreed that

116. See id. at 410, 411 (describing FDIC’s response to vacated order). FDIC argued:
(1) [T]he Relief Motion lacked support; (2) the HOA failed to respond to
the FDIC’s efforts to reach an out-of-court resolution of the Relief
Motion; (3) the HOA failed to notify the FDIC that it planned to file the
Withdrawal Motion; and (4) the HOA’s counsel behaved in a manner
inconsistent with the responsibilities of an officer of the court.
Id.
117. See id. at 412 (describing FDIC’s argument that HOA should be sanctioned under
28 U.S.C. § 1927).
118. See id. at 413 (holding Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos “jointly and
severally” liable). The FDIC requested sanctions in the amount of $11,603.10. See id. at
413–14 (describing sanction requests). This figure represented attorneys’ fees incurred as a
result of preparing for the relief motion. See id. at 414 (describing sanction requests). While
FDIC actually incurred $17,407.20, it lowered the amount requested to “facilitate the Court’s
determination of reasonableness.” See id. (citation omitted) (describing sanction requests).
119. See id. (holding that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez breached professional duty).
120. See id. at 411 (“A quick look at the docket would have revealed to the HOA that
the FDIC–R has a lien over all of the debtor’s assets, covering their entire value.”).
121. See id. at 414 (noting Castellanos’s objections to sanctions). Castellanos argued
that “law firms are not responsible for the signatures of their attorneys[,]” law firms are not
liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s conduct did not rise to the level
of sanctionable conduct under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See id. (noting Castellanos’s objections to
sanctions).
122. See id. (affirming sanctions against Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos).
Before the court affirmed the sanctions, FDIC responded to Castellanos’s objections and
Castellanos replied to FDIC’s response. See id. (discussing FDIC’s and Castellanos’s
objections).
123. See id. at 415 (noting appeal to appellate court).
124. See id. at 416 (noting Castellanos’s objections to sanctions).
125. See id. at 421 (affirming district court’s holding).
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Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s failure to respond to FDIC, Mr. Segarra Miranda,
and Trigild, followed by her withdrawal of the relief motion, was “a ‘cavalier
disregard for both the [c]ourt and h[er] colleagues’ time.” 126 The court added
that Castellanos similarly acted unprofessionally throughout the proceedings. 127
In accordance with this conduct, the appellate panel upheld the sanctions
against Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos.128
IV. SERVICE HAS BEEN CANCELLED: SANCTIONING
QUIÑONES-RODRIGUEZ AND CASTELLANOS
In affirming the bankruptcy court’s sanctions against both Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez and Castellanos, the appellate panel concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1927
applies to law firms.129 The court began its analysis with the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and subsequently discussed whether law firms can be held jointly
and severally liable under the statute. 130 After answering the latter question in
the affirmative, the court found that the sanctions against Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez and Castellanos were appropriate.131
A. Elevator Pitch: The Requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1927
After noting that bankruptcy courts in the First Circuit have the power to
issue sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the First Circuit bankruptcy court
proceeded to discuss the requirements of the statute. 132 First, the party’s
126. See id. at 422 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (noting Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez’s behavior violated 28 U.S.C. § 1927). The court added that Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez’s unprofessional behavior was exactly the type of conduct that the statute meant to
deter. See id. (describing behavior intended to be reprimanded by 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
127. See id. (describing Castellanos’s unprofessional behavior throughout
proceedings).
128. See id. at 424 (affirming bankruptcy court’s holding).
129. For the court’s analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 132–38 and
accompanying text.
130. For the court’s analysis of whether law firms are liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
see infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos’s sanctionable
conduct, see infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
132. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 418 (noting split of whether bankruptcy courts
have power to issue sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies to
attorneys admitted “to conduct cases in any court of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(explaining scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1927). There has been some debate as to whether a
bankruptcy court is a “court of the United States.” See In re Casiello, 333 B.R. 571, 573
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (stating debate between courts). Courts cite to 28 U.S.C. § 451 when
holding that bankruptcy courts are not courts “of the United States.” See id. at 574
(distinguishing bankruptcy courts to other courts “of the United States”). 28 U.S.C. § 451
defines a “court of the United States” as including “the Supreme Court of the United States,
courts of appeals, district courts.” Id. (defining “courts of the United States”). Because
bankruptcy courts are not explicitly defined in the statute, some courts deny bankruptcy courts
the authority to issue 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions. See, e.g., In re Sandoval, 186 B.R. 490,
496–97 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (following majority view in Ninth Circuit that bankruptcy
courts are not “courts of the United States”); In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd. Inc., 40 F.3d 1084,
1086 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that “bankruptcy courts are not within the contemplation of
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conduct must “multipl[y] the proceedings” in such a way that causes some
delay in reaching a resolution of the case. 133 For a party to “multipl[y] the
proceedings,” the proceeding must have already begun. 134 A case cannot be
“multiplied” if it has not been filed.135 Further, the court explained that
vexatious conduct must be “harassing or annoying.”136 Finally, while some
courts require that the attorney act in bad faith, the First Circuit adopted the
objective standard, which gives courts a great deal of discretion when imposing
sanctions.137 The judge is expected to use the judge’s experience to determine if
the attorney’s conduct “falls short of the obligations owed by a member of the
bar to the court.”138

§ 1927”). However, district courts in the First Circuit have permitted bankruptcy courts to
sanction attorneys in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See MJS Las Croabas Props., Inc. v.
FDIC, 545 B.R. 401, 418 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (noting bankruptcy courts
are permitted to issue sanctions in First Circuit). For instance, the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Massachusetts, which sits in the First Circuit, issued 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions
against counsel for failing to respond to discovery requests in a timely fashion and failing to
appear at examinations. See In re Lincoln N. Assocs., Ltd. P’ship, 163 B.R. 403, 410–11
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (sanctioning attorneys for unethical behavior). Further, the court in In
re Casiello held that “a bankruptcy court is a court of the United States because it is a unit of
the district court.” See In re Casiello, 333 B.R. at 575 (citation omitted) (describing
bankruptcy court as part of district court system).
133. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d
1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is to deter “intentional and
unnecessary delay in the proceedings”). Although the MJS Las Croabas court does not
specifically discuss the Beatrice Foods Co. case in its opinion, Beatrice Foods Co. has been
cited to set forth the principle purpose of the statute. See James F. Holderman, Section 1927
Sanctions and the Split Among the Circuits, 32 AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. LITIG. 44, 45 (2005).
134. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 418–19 (quoting Jensen v. Phillips Screw Co.,
546 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008)) (“In the First Circuit’s view, Congress’s use of the verb
‘multipl[y]’ in the text of the statute ‘clearly contemplates that, to be sanctionable thereunder,
conduct must have an effect on an already initiated proceeding.’”).
135. See id. (explaining how cases are “multiplied”).
136. See id. at 419 (quoting Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 245 (1st Cir.
2010)) (explaining meaning of “vexatious” conduct); see also Jensen, 546 F.3d at 64
(“Garden-variety carelessness or even incompetence, without more, will not suffice to ground
the imposition of sanctions under section 1927.”). In Jordan v. City of Detroit, the court
refused to sanction an attorney who filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement before
that agreement was finalized. See Jordan v. City of Detroit, 595 F. App’x. 486, 487 (6th Cir.
2014) (describing attorney conduct that was not sanctionable). The court held that, although
the attorney was mistaken about the law, it did not rise to the level of “vexatious” behavior.
See id. at 488 (providing holding of case).
137. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 419 (citation omitted) (noting objective
standard of review). The court explained, “[i]n assessing whether an attorney acted
unreasonably and vexatiously, the First Circuit instructs courts to apply an objective
standard.” Id. (citation omitted). An objective standard asks whether opposing counsel
incurred costs because of the attorney’s conduct. See Ardiola Sinaj, Attorneys’ Ability to Pay
Sanctions Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 15 J. L. SOC’Y 335, 339 (2013–2014) (citation omitted)
(describing objective and subjective interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1927). This standard is
different from the subjective view that determines whether the attorney acted in bad faith. See
id. (describing subjective interpretation).
138. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 419 (citing Rathbun v. Warren Cty. Schs., 825
F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987)) (describing sanctionable conduct under 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
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B. It’s a Party Line: Holding both Law Firms and Attorneys
Liable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Following its discussion of the requirements and standard of review of 28
U.S.C. § 1927, the court analyzed whether the statute encompasses law firms.139
Acknowledging that nothing in the statute explicitly holds law firms liable, the
court needed to resolve this “threshold” question. 140 To accomplish this task,
the court looked at how other courts resolved this specific question.141
Several circuit courts have sanctioned law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.142
However, the court centered its focus on the reasoning in Brignoli from the
Southern District of New York.143 Citing the Brignoli court’s reasoning, the
First Circuit bankruptcy court conceded that when an individual sees the word
“personally” in the statute, a law firm is not the first thing that comes to
mind.144 However, because the statute is meant to cover attorney conduct, and
not client conduct, it is reasonable that the law firms supervising those attorneys
can also be held liable.145
Further, the MJS Las Croabas court held that the legislature intended the
statute to cover “entities who ‘conduct cases.’” 146 The court agreed with the
139. See id. at 419 (introducing question of whether law firms can be sanctioned under
28 U.S.C. § 1927).
140. See id. (“The statute does not explicitly provide for vicarious liability.”). Law
firms should be held to the same standard as corporations. See Ted Schneyer, Professional
Discipline for Law Firms, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 28 (1991) (arguing that law firms should be
held liable for attorney conduct). Under the doctrine of “respondeat superior,” law firms
would be held liable for attorney conduct just as corporations are liable for the negligence of
their employees. See id. (comparing law firm liability to corporations under respondeat
superior doctrine).
141. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 420 (referring to other court holdings as to
whether law firms can be held liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
142. For a discussion of cases that sanctioned law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see
supra notes 62–84 and accompanying text.
143. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 420 (following reasoning from Brignoli v.
Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
144. See id. (citing Brignoli, 735 F. Supp. at 101–02) (describing meaning of word
“personally” in statute).
145. See id. (holding law firms liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927). According to the
Brignoli court, law firms “naturally fall” within the category of “other person[s] admitted to
conduct cases.” See Brignoli, 735 F. Supp. at 102 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1927). In Brignoli,
both an attorney and his law firm were sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See id. at 101
(discussing outcome of case). The court reasoned that because the attorney was a named
partner of the law firm, and the law firm employed other attorneys who worked on the case,
sanctions against the law firm were appropriate. See id. (explaining court’s reasoning). In
fact, the court noted that the law firm personified itself in its brief, making statements such as,
“We have also shown that our positions taken at the time were reasonable.” See id. at 102 n.2
(explaining court’s reasoning).
146. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 420 (citation omitted) (describing legislature’s
intent). 28 U.S.C. § 1927 was enacted to “prevent attorneys from filing multiple suits when
the matter only required a single proceeding.” Kevin J. Henderson, When Is an Attorney
Unreasonable and Vexatious?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 249, 250 n.5 (1988) (citing 26
ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813)) (describing legislature’s intent for creating 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
Law firms did not exist when the statute was enacted in 1813. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH,
SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 21(C)(2) (5th ed. 2013) (noting
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Brignoli court that law firms are “entities who ‘conduct cases.’” 147 Because it
was a basic assumption of courts that law firms are included in the statute, the
court did not feel the need to explicitly address it. 148
Following its discussion of Brignoli, the First Circuit bankruptcy court
noted which other circuits have refused to sanction law firms under the
statute.149 For instance, the Ninth Circuit did not extend 28 U.S.C § 1927 to law
firms, reasoning that Congress would have explicitly included “law firms” in
the statute if it were meant to reach them. 150 In support of the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning, the Seventh Circuit held that only individual attorneys, and not law
firms, are admitted to conduct cases.151
Finally, the MJS Las Croabas court turned to an opinion from the First
Circuit, which implicitly ruled that law firms can be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.152 In Jensen, the First Circuit Court reviewed a district court’s ruling
where the law firm was sanctioned.153 The circuit court remanded the case on
absence of law firms when statute was created). The statute was last amended in 1980. See
id. (providing history of statute).
147. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 421 (citation omitted) (agreeing with Brignoli
that law firms are persons who conduct cases).
148. See id. at 420 (citing Brignoli, 735 F. Supp. at 101–02) (explaining why question
of whether law firms covered under statute was not explicitly discussed). Sanctioning law
firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 has only been implicit. See id. (explaining implicit nature of
sanctions). In Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, Inc., the circuit court affirmed § 1927
sanctions against a law firm. See Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., 855 F.2d 1009, 1020
(2d Cir. 1988) (affirming sanctions against law firm). In that case, the court examined only
whether the sanctions were appropriate and not whether law firms were the appropriate target
of the sanction. See id. (explaining court’s reasoning to sanction law firm). Finding that the
trial court did not err in issuing sanctions, the court implicitly held that law firms can be
sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See id. (providing holding of case).
149. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 421 (noting courts that did not issue sanctions
against law firms). For a discussion of courts that did not extend 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions
to law firms, see supra notes 49–61 and accompanying text.
150. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 421 (citing Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir. 2015)) (discussing Congress’s intent).
151. See id. (citing Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005)) (noting
non-attorney individuals who are admitted to conduct cases).
152. See id. (citing Jensen v. Phillips Screw Co., 546 F.3d 59, 68 (1st Cir. 2008))
(noting implicit ruling in First Circuit).
153. See id. (reviewing district court sanctions against law firm). In Jensen, the law
firm Stewart, Estes, & Donnell filed four separate claims against the Phillips Screw Company.
See Jensen, 546 F.3d at 61 (discussing claims of case). The law firm accused Phillips of
manufacturing faulty screws. See id. (discussing claims of case). The first claim was
dismissed because the plaintiff had previously resolved all issues with Phillips. See id.
(discussing claims of case). Stewart, Estes, & Donnell then added a second plaintiff;
however, that plaintiff ultimately decided not to litigate. See id. at 62 (discussing claims of
case). A third plaintiff was added, but it was subsequently discovered Phillips did not
manufacture the screw that the plaintiff was using. See id. (discussing procedural history).
Finally, Stewart, Estes, & Donnell substituted a fourth plaintiff. See id. (discussing procedural
history). However, after the court inquired about the suitability of this plaintiff, Stewart,
Estes, & Donnell withdrew its claim. See id. (discussing procedural history). Although 28
U.S.C. § 1927 is not an appropriate sanction for Stewart, Estes, & Donnell’s first complaint
because the proceeding must have begun, the three subsequent amendments were subject to
sanctions under the statute. See id. at 63 (explaining amendments that were subject to
sanctions). The trial court sanctioned the law firm Stewart, Estes, & Donnell for multiplying
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another matter, without addressing the sanctions. 154 The MJS Las Croabas
court reasoned that implicit in the Jensen court’s decision was that 28 U.S.C. §
1927 applies to law firms because it was not overturned on review. 155 In
affirming the bankruptcy court’s sanctions against Castellanos, the court found
the Jensen and Brignoli holdings, as well as the holdings from the Second,
Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, persuasive. 156
C. Time for a Wake-Up Call: Punishing the Unprofessional Behavior
of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos
Because of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s unresponsiveness to opposing
counsel, and Castellanos’s failure to act on several occasions, the First Circuit
bankruptcy court affirmed the lower court’s holding that both Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez’s and Castellanos’ unprofessional conduct warranted sanctions under
28 U.S.C. § 1927.157 Their misconduct caused opposing counsel to incur
unnecessary expenses.158 The court held that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s
“behavior. . . is precisely the type of behavior targeted by § 1927.”159
In addition to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez, the court held that Castellanos was
also responsible for the expenses incurred by opposing counsel. 160 Castellanos
failed to act on several occasions.161 The court found it most surprising that
Castellanos remained uninvolved even after it was threatened with sanctions. 162
It also rejected Castellanos’s argument that the law firm was unaware of Mr.
the proceedings, and the firm appealed. See id. (sanctioning law firms). The appellate court
held that, considering these facts, the district court may have abused its discretion in
sanctioning the conduct; however, the court did not hold that law firms fall outside the scope
of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See id. at 67–68 (providing holding of case).
154. See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R.,at 420–21 (citing Jensen, 546 F.3d at 68)
(describing that case was remanded without ruling whether law firms can be sanctioned under
statute).
155. See id. (citing that First Circuit courts have implicitly sanctioned law firms under
28 U.S.C. § 1927).
156. See id. (following decisions in Jensen and Second, Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits).
157. See id. at 421–22 (describing bankruptcy court’s holding).
158. See id. at 421 (noting expenses incurred from Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s
misconduct). Because of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s unresponsiveness, FDIC, Trustee, and
Trigild were all forced to prepare oppositions to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s motion, as well as
prepare for and travel to the hearing. See id. (describing facts of case). If Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez responded to their phone calls and emails, all of the expenses could have been
avoided. See id. (explaining focal problem).
159. See id. at 422 (citing Lamboy–Ortiz v. Ortiz–Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 245–46 (1st
Cir.2010)) (describing type of behavior targeted by 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
160. See id. (holding Castellanos “jointly and severally liable” for Ms. QuiñonesRodriguez’s behavior).
161. See id. (describing Castellanos’s failure to act in response to opposing counsel’s
actions). Castellanos “remained silent when confronted with the FDIC’s Response to the
Withdrawal Motion, the Trustee’s Sanctions Request, the October 2014 Sanctions Orders, and
the FDIC’s Reply to HOA’s Opposition.” Id. (describing same).
162. See id. (“Even the court’s admonition from the bench at the September 2014
Hearing that it was inclined to grant the pending requests for sanctions, which included a
request for sanctions against the Castellanos Firm, did not elicit a response from the firm.”).
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Sandell’s travel arrangements to Puerto Rico for the September 9, 2014
hearing.163 Finally, the court was unconvinced that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez
was an independent contractor of Castellanos. 164
V. GETTING MIXED SIGNALS: THE LEGISLATURE SAYS ONE
THING BUT SHOULD HAVE SAID ANOTHER
Future courts may face a dilemma when confronted with a sanction request
against a law firm under 28 U.S.C § 1927.165 On the one hand, intuition tells us
that law firms do not naturally fall within the language of the statute. 166 On the
other hand, intuition also tells us that they should. 167 Therefore, until the
legislature or Supreme Court says otherwise, courts will likely struggle with
reconciling what they think the legislature intended and what they think the
legislature should have intended.168 Further, although it is unlikely that
Congress intended for the statute to apply to law firms, amending the statute to
include law firms would better serve the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.169

163. See id. (rejecting argument that Castellanos was unaware that opposing counsel
was travelling to motion hearing).
164. See id. (rejecting argument that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez was independent
contractor for Castellanos). The court noted the following factors to determine if an
individual is an independent contractor:
[T]he hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished . . . ; the skills required; the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired
party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of
payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether
the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the
tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 422 n.19 (citing Alberty–Velez v. Corporación de P.R. Para La Difusión Pública, 361
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004)) (listing factors to determine whether someone is independent
contractor). Further, Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez represented herself as an attorney of the
Castellanos law firm. See id. (indicating relevant facts in determining holding).
165. For a critical analysis of sanctioning law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra
notes 170–214 and accompanying text.
166. For an analysis of why firms are unlikely to be liable under the current language
of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 170–93 and accompanying text.
167. For an analysis of the reason firms should be liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see
infra notes 195-214 and accompanying text.
168. For a critical analysis of sanctioning law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra
notes 170–214 and accompanying text.
169. For a discussion of why it is unlikely that law firms are covered by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, see infra notes 170–93 and accompanying text. For a discussion of why firms should
be included in the statute, see infra notes 194–214 and accompanying text.
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A. Wrong Number: 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Likely
Does Not Apply to Law Firms
Courts have an obligation to enforce a statute as the legislature intended.170
To meet this obligation, courts must determine the legislature’s intent in
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1927.171 Although this task may prove to be difficult,
courts use several methods to determine the legislature’s intent. 172
Legislative intent in the present context helps courts understand whether
law firms are “person[s] admitted to conduct cases.” 173 There are several
definitions for the word “person.” 174 Most relevant is Congress’s definition,
which states, “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the
context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies, as well as individuals.”175 Therefore, it is a reasonable
assumption that law firms are considered “persons” under this definition
because “firms” are explicitly mentioned.176
Although law firms may be persons according to the legislature, the issue
remains whether they are persons who are “admitted to conduct cases.”177 State
bar associations determine who can be admitted to conduct cases. 178 Many
170. See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and
the Legislative Process 4 (1997) (“[T]he judicial will must bend to the legislative
command[.]”). There are varying theories of how statutes should be interpreted. See id. at
50–52 (identifying different theories). Following a traditional approach, courts may consider
the text, the legislative history, and canons of construction. See id. at 50 (considering
traditional approach). Following a textualist approach, courts will consider only the text of
the statute and surrounding statutes, and apply the canons of construction. See id. at 52
(considering textualist approach).
171. See id. at 4 (describing how courts must determine legislative intent).
172. For a discussion of the statutory interpretation methods that courts use in
determining legislative intent, see infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
173. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (identifying statutory ambiguity). For a further discussion
of this issue and the present split among the circuit courts, see supra notes 47–84 and
accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ed. 2009) (defining person as
either “a human being” or “an entity . . . that is recognized by law as having the rights and
duties of a human being”); Person, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/person [https://perma.cc/5E6C-VSQF] (last
visited Sept. 19, 2016) (defining person as “a human being”). Congress includes
“corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals” in its definition of “person.” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
175. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (explaining definition of “person” established by Congress).
176. See Richard Bobholz, Law Firm Choice of Entity, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/tyl/topics/solo-small-firm/law-firm-choiceentity.html [https://perma.cc/CS67-SWVW] (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (listing types of law
firm entities). Law firms may be formed as corporations, limited liability corporations, S
corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships. See id. (identifying law firms’
governance structure).
177. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (applying statute to “persons who conduct cases”).
178. See NAT’L CONF. BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 1
(Erica Moeser & Claire J. Guback eds., 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Comprehensi
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states require bar applicants to have completed a bachelor’s degree. 179 Almost
all states require the applicant to have a law degree. 180 And among those states
that do not require a law degree, the applicant must still fulfill apprenticeship
requirements.181 Most notably, the applicant must take—and pass—the bar
examination.182
Based on these admission requirements, it is likely that Claiborne and
similar courts interpreted the statute correctly; law firms are not individuals
admitted to conduct cases.183 Law firms do not hold a bachelor’s degree. 184
They have not attended law school.185 They have not worked with a judge.186
And they did not sit for the bar exam. 187 If law firms cannot meet the
requirements to be admitted to the bar, then they cannot be admitted to conduct
cases.188 Further, even if ambiguity exists as to whether law firms are
“individuals who conduct cases,” the rule of lenity dictates that the statute be
construed most favorably to the defendant, which, in this case, would be the law
firm.189

veGuidetoBarAdmissions/2016_comp_guide.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XTDGHQ4] [hereinafter GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS] (describing state requirements for bar
admission).
179. See id. at 2 (listing states that require bachelor’s degree to be admitted to state
bar).
180. See id. 8–11 (listing states that require law school diploma to be admitted to state
bar). However, some states do not require a formal legal education from a law school. See
Sean Patrick Farrell, The Lawyer’s Apprentice, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/education/edlife/how-to-learn-the-law-without-lawschool.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/WLE5-56AV]. Among these states are California,
Wyoming, Vermont, and Virginia. See id. (identifying states that do not have formal legal
education requirements). However, they do require apprenticeships. See id. (stating
requirements of states that do not require formal education).
181. See Corey Adwar, There’s a Way to Become an Attorney Without Setting Foot in
Law School, BUS. INSIDER (July 30, 2014, 6:21 PM) http://www.businessinsider.com/how-tobecome-an-attorney-without-law-school-2014-7 [https://perma.cc/ET63-5YTW] (describing
requirements for bar admissions in states that do not require attending law school). Those
who substitute law school for an apprenticeship are known as “law readers.” See id.
(explaining common name).
182. See GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS, supra note 178 (requiring bar applicants to pass
exam).
183. See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing
circumstances when non-attorneys can conduct cases).
184. For a discussion of bachelor’s degree requirements, see supra note 180 and
accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of apprenticeship requirements, see supra note 181 and
accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of law degree requirements, see supra notes 180–81 and
accompanying text.
187. For a discussion of bar exam requirements, see supra note 182 and accompanying
text.
188. For discussion of bar admission requirements, see supra notes 178–82 and
accompanying text.
189. See JOSEPH, supra note 146, at 436 (describing rule of lenity). The rule of lenity
dictates that statutes be interpreted as narrowly as possible for the benefit of the defendant.
See William D. Popkin, A Dictionary of Statutory Interpretation 191 (2007) (explaining rule
of lenity). The rule also encourages the legislature to draft statutes that place potential
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If law firms are not “individuals who conduct cases,” the question then
becomes, to which individuals was the legislature referring? 190 As the court in
Claiborne explained, there are rare circumstances when a law student may
appear before the court and when non-attorneys appear in patent disputes.191
Thus, it is possible, if not probable, that the legislature was referring to these
individuals, and not law firms, when drafting 28 U.S.C. § 1927.192 As a result,
it is unlikely that law firms are covered by the current language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.193
B. Adding a Second Line: Law Firms Should Be
Held Liable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
While there may be doubt as to whether law firms really are persons for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the decision in MJS Las Croabas represents a
step in the right direction.194 The two predominant theories for imposing 28
U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions are (1) to punish and deter misconduct, and (2) to
compensate opposing counsel for any expenses that they incurred as a result of
the misconduct.195 Either of these objectives, along with the general purpose of
imposing sanctions, will be accomplished by holding law firms liable under 28
U.S.C. § 1927.196 Punishing law firms would incentivize them to monitor
attorney compliance with ethical standards, thus preventing future

offenders on notice of whether the conduct is wrongful and whether it applies to them. See
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 204 (1999) (describing rule of lenity). Applying the rule of lenity to 28
U.S.C. § 1927 would likely absolve law firms from any liability because “persons admitted to
conduct cases” would be narrowly interpreted to exclude law firms. See id. at 191.
190. For an explanation of why law firms are likely not “individuals who conduct
cases,” see supra notes 170–89 and accompanying text.
191. See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing
circumstances when non-attorneys can conduct cases). For example, a patent agent is
admitted to prosecute patent cases. See Patent Agent FAQ, PATENT LAW AT NOTRE DAME,
http://patentlaw.nd.edu/patent-agent-and-program-faq [https://perma.cc/N69R-ABMJ] (last
visited Oct. 2, 2016) (describing patent agents and patent attorneys). Patent agents differ from
patent attorneys in that they have not attended law school, nor are they admitted to a state bar.
See id. (distinguishing patent agents and patent attorneys). In California, certified students
can represent clients in trials. See CAL. R. 9.42(d)(3).
192. For a discussion of how courts interpret legislative intent, see supra notes 173–76
and accompanying text.
193. For a discussion of why it is unlikely that law firms are covered by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, see supra notes 170–92 and accompanying text.
194. For an explanation of why law firms should be held liable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, see infra notes 195–214 and accompanying text.
195. See Sinaj, supra note 137, at 339 (citation omitted) (describing two different
interpretations of purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
196. See Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 1, AM. BAR ASS’N
(2015) (describing purposes of sanctions). The purposes of sanctions are “protecting the
public, upholding the integrity of the legal system, assuring the fair administration of justice,
and deterring other lawyers from similar misconduct.” Id. (explaining objectives of statute).
For lawyers to effectively serve the public, they must earn the public’s trust. See id. at 5
(identifying key factors in serving public). A lawyer who breaches that trust should be
disciplined. See id. (explaining disciple for breaching attorney duties).
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misconduct.197 Law firms are also in a better position to compensate opposing
counsel.198
1.

Conference Call: Sanctioning Law Firms Will Have a Greater Influence on
Attorney Behavior

One view of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is that it is meant to punish and deter
attorneys from “unreasonably and vexatiously” delaying or prolonging
proceedings.199 When an individual is punished, the individual is less likely to
engage in future misconduct because of an increased perception that the
individual will be caught.200 Similarly, any peers who have observed the
punishment will be less likely to engage in future misconduct. 201 Therefore, if
an individual attorney is punished for a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the
sanctions will deter both that specific attorney and that attorney’s peers who
observe the punishment.202
While sanctioning an individual attorney will affect both that attorney and
the attorney’s surrounding peers, sanctioning the law firm will have an
influence on most, if not all, attorneys at the law firm. 203 When a law firm is
sanctioned, it often suffers a loss in reputation and, consequently, a loss of
business.204 Therefore, the threat of these adverse effects will incentivize law
firms to adopt a culture that encourages ethical and efficient lawyering. 205 By

197. For a discussion of how sanctions motivate law firms to monitor attorneys, see
infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion of why law firms are in a better position to pay sanctions, see
infra notes 211–14 and accompanying text.
199. For a discussion of the goals of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see supra note 195 and
accompanying text.
200. See Greg Pogarsky & Alex R. Piquero, Can Punishment Encourage Offending?
Investigating the “Resetting” Effect, 40 J. RES. CRIME AND DELINQ. 95, 97 (2003) (citations
omitted) (describing effect of individual punishment).
201. See Linda Klebe Trevino, The Social Effects of Punishment in Organizations: A
Justice Perspective, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 647, 650 (1992) (citations omitted) (discussing
social effect of punishment).
202. For a discussion of why punishment deters individuals and their peers, see supra
notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
203. See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 378 (2003)
(noting that groups can influence and control individual members).
204. See Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2336, 2338 (2005) (describing adverse effects of sanctions). There is a stigma attached to
sanctions. See id. (explaining stigma). Both lawyers and firms will suffer a loss in reputation
after being sanctioned. See id. (identifying loss in reputation). Further, this stigma may create
a financial loss that manifests when the law firm loses business. See id. (explaining effects of
sanctions). Research suggests that corporations are more concerned with the possibility of
negative publicity than economic sanctions. See Schneyer, supra note 140, at 34 (citation
omitted) (describing negative publicity following sanctions). This loss in reputation might not
occur if an individual attorney is sanctioned because the law firm can argue that the unethical
attorney is not an accurate reflection of the law firm’s ethical standards. See id.
(differentiating consequences between sanctioned law firms and attorneys).
205. See Levinson, supra note 203, at 349 (describing how collective sanctions
motivate groups to monitor individuals). When an entire group is threatened with sanctions,
the group will change its ethical infrastructure. See id. (noting effects of sanctions). Levinson
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adopting a culture that promotes ethics, as well as implementing an ethical
infrastructure, law firms will be able to influence the ethical conduct of all
attorneys at the law firm.206
In addition to influencing more attorneys at the law firm, holding law firms
jointly and severally liable has other benefits that will prevent misconduct.207
First, sanctioning the law firm as a group recognizes the attorney as a member
of the firm, and identification with the firm will make it more likely that the

explains that changing group norms or introducing ethics initiatives can accomplish this
change. See id. (identifying how ethical infrastructure can be corrected).
206. See Patrick J. Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 910 (1999)
(describing effect of firm culture on ethical decision-making). Schlitz argues that law firms
have a subtle way of getting attorneys to adopt their values. See id. at 912 (identifying
lawyers’ reluctance to adopt ethical values). This shift in values may ultimately lead to
unethical behavior. See id. at 915 (explaining how lawyers can become unethical). For
example, the pressure of meeting billable hour requirements leads some attorneys to
manipulate their time sheets. See id. at 917 (explaining how lawyers may become unethical).
Further, some argue that law firms may also reward attorneys for engaging in unethical
behavior and may also represent clients that expect “hyper-aggressive lawyering.” See Austin
Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and Lawyers’ Accounts of Ethics
and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 827 (1998) (describing ways firm
culture influences ethical decision-making); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B.
Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research
and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 692 (2002) (advocating for ethical infrastructures in
law firms); Ted Schneyer, supra note 140, at 12 (describing that law firm discipline will
“supplement” attorney discipline). This effect is illustrated in an example described by
Schneyer. See Schneyer, supra note 140, at 2 (citation omitted). Attorneys in Kirkland &
Ellis’s Chicago office represented a uranium corporation in an antitrust case. See id. (citation
omitted). Unbeknownst to Kirkland & Ellis’s Chicago office, however, their Washington
office was representing the American Petroleum Institute, an opposing party to the uranium
company. See id. (citation omitted) (explaining conflicts of interest). The law firm was
forced to drop the case because of the conflict of interest. See id. (citation omitted)
(explaining actions taken to prevent conflicts of interest). Schneyer attributes the existence of
the conflict of interest to the law firm’s failure to take measures to detect such conflicts. See
id. at 10 (identifying failure in law firm procedures). If the law firm had a system to detect
conflicts, then the issue could have been avoided. See id. (explaining how law firm could
have prevented conflict of interest). People often know right from wrong, but that does not
always translate to ethical decision-making. See generally Charles D. Kerns, Creating and
Sustaining an Ethical Workplace Culture, 6 GRAZIADIO BUS. REV. (2003),
https://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/creating-and-sustaining-an-ethical-workplace-culture
[https://perma.cc/S46P-S6B2] (finding that some criminals know what right thing to do is but
do not do it). The United States Sentencing Commission introduces seven factors for an
effective corporate ethics program: (1) implementing procedures that detect misconduct, (2)
educating supervisors on the compliance procedures and ensuring that the guidelines are being
followed, (3) refraining from hiring individuals with a criminal background, (4) offering
ethical training programs, (5) monitoring and auditing employee misconduct, determining the
effectiveness of the compliance program, and making sure that the employees are aware of the
program, (6) introducing incentives for compliance and punishment to deter noncompliance,
and (7) punishing those who engage in unethical behavior. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011) (listing minimal
requirements to encourage ethical conduct).
207. For a discussion of the additional benefits of sanctioning law firms, see infra notes
208–14.
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attorney adopts the firm’s culture and ethics. 208 Holding law firms liable will
also encourage them to fulfill their duty of ensuring that attorneys follow the
Rules of Professional Conduct.209 Therefore, holding law firms liable under 28
U.S.C. § 1927 would encourage them to fulfill these duties. 210
2.

Paying the Bill: Law Firms Are in a Better Position to Cover Expenses

A second interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is that it is meant to
compensate opposing counsel for unnecessary expenses resulting from an
opposing attorney’s misconduct.211 Law firms are often in a better position to
pay these expenses than an individual attorney. 212 Holding law firms liable will
increase the likelihood that the affected attorney will be compensated for
expenses incurred.213 Therefore, if the purpose of 28 U.S.C. §1927 is to
compensate opposing counsel, holding law firms liable will better serve this
purpose because they are in a better position to pay the fines. 214
VI. GET CONGRESS ON THE PHONE: 28 U.S.C. § 1927 SHOULD
BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE LAW FIRMS
The circuit split over whether 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies to law firms
indicates the need for a quick resolution, and the legislature is in the best
208. See Milton C. Reagan, Jr., Nested Ethics: A Tale of Two Cultures, 42 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 143, 145 (2013) (citing Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating
Compliance Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 975,
978 (2012)) (finding greater identification by employee with company corresponds with
greater likelihood of following compliance programs).
209. See MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (explaining
effects of professional conduct rules). Rule 5.1(a) provides that:
A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with
other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm,
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Id. Part of this duty is to facilitate attorney communication with clients and to ensure that
attorneys engage in efficient legal practices. See id. r. 3.2 (“A lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”).
210. See, e.g., Avner Bar-Ilan & Sacerdote Bruce, The Response of Criminals and
Non-Criminals to Fines, 47 J. L & ECON. 1, 15 (2004) (finding that monetary fines deter
drivers from running red lights); Todd L. Cherry, Financial Penalties as an Alternative to
Criminal Sanction: Evidence from Panel Data, 29 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 450, 456 (2001)
(arguing that monetary fines are effective alternative to criminal penalties).
211. For a discussion of the goals of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see supra note 195 and
accompanying text.
212. See Schneyer, supra note 140, at 33 (citation omitted) (illustrating that firms are
more capable of paying fines).
213. See Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Punishing the Innocent Along with
the Guilty: The Economics of Individual Versus Group Punishment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 81, 86
(2007) (describing benefits of punishing group instead of individual).
214. For a discussion of why law firms are in a better position to pay sanctions, see
supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
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position to accomplish this feat.215 Regardless of how the statute is ultimately
interpreted, a uniform interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 will give law firms and
attorneys the opportunity to predict the consequences of their actions. 216
Inconsistent interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 will only create confusion
among law firms and give some an unfair advantage over others. 217 This
unfairness is especially true as sanction requests under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 are
becoming more common.218
However, adopting the MJS Las Croabas court’s reasoning would benefit
the legal profession as a whole.219 Holding law firms liable would likely
incentivize them to ensure attorney compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1927.220
Further, law firms are in the best position to monitor and influence attorney
conduct because attorneys are under their supervision. 221 Sanctioning law firms
would give them the incentive to take advantage of that position and introduce
an infrastructure that encourages ethical and professional behavior. 222 And
increasing attorney ethics and professionalism would improve the public’s view
of the legal institution, fostering a more trustworthy and efficient legal
system.223

215. For an explanation of why the legislature or Supreme Court must clarify the
interpretation of the statute, see infra notes 216–18 and accompanying text.
216. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1584 (2008)
(citing Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decision Making, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38–40 (1994)) (explaining that uniform
interpretation of statutes creates predictability).
217. See Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the
Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 618 (claiming that
inconsistent interpretations create confusion). When the legislature is attempting to control
future behavior via statute, different interpretations of that statute will undermine the
objective. See id. (providing reasoning behind statute). Further, the different interpretations
will create unfair results both from a judicial viewpoint and a competitive one. See id.
(explaining effects of statute). Applying this concept to the issue here, a law firm in the Sixth
Circuit will not be liable for attorney conduct, but a firm in the First Circuit will. See id.
(identifying when law firm is liable in First Circuit). As a result, the Sixth Circuit firm may
have a competitive advantage over the First Circuit firm. See id. (distinguishing between First
and Sixth Circuits).
218. See Sinaj, supra note 137, at 345 (describing how 28 U.S.C. § 1927 has become
substitute for Rule 11).
219. For an explanation of why sanctioning law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 would
improve attorney ethics, see supra notes 203–10 and accompanying text.
220. For an explanation of why holding law firms liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 will
likely give them the incentive to promote ethical behavior, see supra notes 204–06 and
accompanying text.
221. For an explanation of why law firms are in the best position to control attorney
behavior, see supra notes 203–13 and accompanying text.
222. For an explanation of why sanctioning law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 would
give them the incentive to create a better ethical infrastructure, see supra notes 204–08 and
accompanying text.
223. See Piero Mella & Patrizia Gazzola, Ethics Builds Reputation, 1 INT’L J. MKTS. &
BUS. SYS. 38, 39 (2015) (describing relationship between ethical behavior and reputation).
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